While the introduction of the GST continues to dominate economic and political debate in Australia, in terms of its efficiency, equity and compliance cost implications, a neglected but important aspect of the tax refonn package focuses on Commonwealth-State financial relations. A central feature of the reform is the replacement of a set of narrowly based and inefficient indirect taxes levied by the Commonwealth and State Governments with the national GST. This is accompanied by substantial reductions in personal income tax rates. giving rise to important implications for the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VA). the efficiency of the States' tax regimes and the capacity of the States to maintain discretion over their fiscal regimes. The Queensiand Government has claimed that the initial State compensation arrangements were grossly inequitable, and that subsequent features of the initiative will impede the Queensland Government's capacity to maintain its low taxation status. This paper concentrates on the themes of equity. VFI, State tax efficiency and the question of whether Queensland's days as a low tax State have been ended. Although the degree of VA can be expected to increase, the elimination of selected State taxes and their replacement with the national GST should facilitate efficiency gains. Moreover, it is concluded that the capacity for the Queensland Government to adjust the remaining components of its tax base, together with the reapplication of the Commonwealth Grants Commission methodology for distributing GST revenues to the States from 2002-03, effectively means that the national GST need not pose a substantial threat to the Queensland Government's capacity to maintain its low tax status. The paper does not attempt to assess the precise impact of the national GST on the economic perfonnance of particular industries in Queensland, which would require extensive econometric and statistical modelling and is outside the scope of this paper.
SHORTCOMINGS OF AUSTRALIA'S TAXATION SYSTEM
The Australian tax system has attracted a great deal of professional attention and criticism. When assessed against the standard tax design criteria ofequity, efficiency and simplicity, Australia's pre-reform taxation arrangements have left many economists -including Mathews (1985) , Smith (1993) and Freebairn (1997) concluding that rather than having a tax system which pays due regard to the principles of tax design, Australia has had one which in fact operates perversely in relation to every major criterion.
Amongst the central features ofthe present reforms are the replacement ofa raft of narrowly-based, inefficient and inequitable indirect taxes levied by the Commonwealth and State Governments with an efficiency-enhancing broad-based goods and services tax (GST), together with major reductions in personal income tax rates. This, however, has implications for the degree of YFI, which is typically defined as "disparities between revenue sources and expenditure requirements among the various levels of government" (Rowand Duhs, I 998a, p.70) and which has already been condemned as "extreme and dysfunctional" in the Australian federation (Rowand Duhs, 1998b) . It follows that any efficiency gains secured by improving the composition ofState taxes must be traded offagainst any inefficiency consequences of increased YFI. As for YFI, Mathews (1982, pp.15-16) contends that" ...the States have shown that they are more concerned with political opportunism than with financial independence, insisting on State rights in virtually every aspect of public policy except the crucial area of fiscal policy..."
In response to the reform package, the Queensland Government claimed that initial features of the transitional State compensation arrangements were grossly inequitable, and that subsequent features ofthe initiative will threaten Queensland's low taxation status. This paper challenges the claim that the national GST necessarily threatens Queensland's low taxation status. The reapplication of the Commonwealth Grants Commission methodology for distributing GST revenues to the States from 2002-2003 (originally 2003-04) effectively means that the national GST need not pose a threat to the Queensland Government's capacity to maintain the State's low level of taxation relative to other Australian States.
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TAX REFORM INITIATIVE
Apart from the introduction of a broad-based GST and major reductions in personal income tax rates, the national tax reform plan initially provided for: 
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• distribution of GST revenues to the States in accordance with the principles of horizontal fiscal capacity equalisation, subject to transitional compensation arrangements whereby the States will be no worse off financially in aggregate than they would be under the current arrangements; and cessation of Commonwealth financial assistance grants (FAGs) to the States on I July 2000, but continuation of Commonwealth specific purpose payments (SPPs) to the States (Queensland Treasury, 1998, pp.27-28; Robinson, 1998, p.IS) . Subsequent negotiations between the Commonwealth Government and the Australian Democrats resulted in revisions, including the exclusion of unprocessed food from the GST base and reductions in the proposed personal income tax cuts for individuals earning between $50,000 and $75,000 per annum (Johnstone, 1999, p.l) . Unsurprisingly, the States objected to the reduced revenue collections pursuant to these amendments, and the extent of the originally proposed State tax reform was scaled back. Moreover, the Commonwealth is expected to retain any increase in GST revenue in the early years by offsetting its Budget Balancing Assistance to States and Territories. Business community supportfor the tax reform package eased its introduction, and reflected acceptance that the indirect tax system was failing to raise sufficient revenue, inevitably leading to the need to find either alternative sources of tax revenue or lower levels of expenditure (Bum, 2000) .
For states and territories, national tax reform ultimately embodied revised funding arrangements with the Commonwealth in the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations (IGA). The main features of the IGA are the abolition of particular State taxes, discontinuation of annual FAGs to the States from I July 2000, and distribution of all GST revenues to the States. The States also agreed to reduce State gambling taxes to "make room" for the GST. In effect, the IGA disadvantages Queensland taxpayers and provides per capita tax reductions in NSW almost four times as large as those in Queensland in 2001 -02 (Queensland Government 2000 . The impact ofthe reform ofState taxes will not be spread evenly across the States (Queensland Government 2000, p.63). The major difference between the old and new arrangements is that, under the IGA, untied revenue grants will be determined by an agreed formula, ratherthan by negotiation at the annual Premier's Conference.
EQillTY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERIM REVENUE-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
The Commonwealth Government's tax reform package provides for the distribution of GST revenues to the States in accordance with the principle of horizontal fiscal capacity equalisation. During the transitional phase (2000-01 to 2002-03) , however, GST revenues will be distributed to the States in accordance with the requirement "that the States will be no worse off financially in aggregate than they would be under the current arrangements. Payments under this aggregate funding guarantee will be made so that the budgetary position of each State and Territory will be no worse off in each year" (Queensland Treasury, 1998, p.29 In this context it is apparent that the tax reform compensation arrangements initially proposed were justifiably criticised by the Queensland Government (see Beattie, 1998; Queensland Treasury, 1998 and Robinson, 1998 Treasury, 1998, p.28; and 1999, pAl Treasury (1998, p.29) suggest that approximately $1.26 billion in FAGs would be required to achieve the outcome that the States in aggregate will not be left in an inferior financial position. However, Queensland Treasury (1998, p.29) funding in numerous areas, including housing funding (by $84 million over three years), tax-equivalents (an additional $54 million) and increased local government funding ($38 million) (Franklin, 1999) . Nevertheless, contrary to the principle of fiscal capacity equalisation, Queensland taxpayers win in fact be required to subsidise the removal of bed taxes and financial institutions duty (FlO) by other States, including New South Wales and Victoria. In short, Queenslanders will be required to help pay for the continuation ofhigher service levels in the larger States, despite its earlier decision not to provide such service levels to its own citizens.
According to Cleary (1999, pA) , the revised IGA estimates prepared by the Commonwealth Government reveal that the GST win raise $24.2 binion in the first year of operation, $3 billion less than the original estimate. Similarly, by 2002-03, the GST would generate $29.2 binion, compared with the $32.8 billion originally predicted. Queensland' s fiscal benefit from the revised tax sharing arrangements is expected to plateau at approximately $500 million per annum in 2005-06 (Lloyd, 1999, p.26) . In consequence of such vagaries, continuing uncertainty surrounds the fiscal package, and its implications for Queensland.
IMPLICATIONS FOR VFI

VFI Defined and Associated Problems
Like other federations, the Australian federation is characterised by vertical fiscal imbalance (VFl). VFl prevails when one level of government has financial resources in excess ofthe revenue required to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities. In 1996-97, the Commonwealth Government collected approximately 72 per cent of total public sector revenues but accounted for only about 54 per cent of outlays. In contrast,the State Governments in 1996-97 collected approximately 24 per cent oflotal revenues but were responsible for approximately 42 per cent oflotal public sector outlays (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.70; Rowand Duhs, 1998b, p.56) . Such problems as diminished State accountability and increased State revenue uncertainty associated with VFI have come to be seen as impediments to public sector efficiency and thus to national economic efficiency (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.71; Rowand Duhs, 1998b, pp.56-57) . The Queensland Government (2000, p.57) noted that national tax reform win increase the dependence of states and territories on Commonwealth funding: "In 2000-0 I, Commonwealth grants will represent 47 per cent of Queensland's total revenue, compared with 43 per cent in 1999-2000." This percentage will be even higher with the further planned abolition of State taxes under the IGA. In short, the Commonwealth's tax reform package win exacerbate VFl. Table I reports VFl ratios by state for recent years. Robinson (1998) 
Note:
The ratios reponed are of own·source revenue to own expenditure.
Allhough revenue sharing does partially salisfy the States' desire for greater predictability in their annual funding, and although it also ensures the retention of auniform, centrally administered income tax system and the avoidance ofanumber , of potential allocalive inefficiencies and distortions that might be associated with handing back specific tax powers to sub-national jurisdictions (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, pp.74-75) , revenue sharing nonetheless does not fully address all the concerns surrounding VFI. To the extent that it will not parallel a reduction in Commonwealth specific purpose grants, for example, the proposed package does not reduce the Commonwealth's capacity to enforce its expenditure preferences upon the States. Moreover, the accountability gains, ifany, are likely to be marginal because revenue sharing passes responsibility to the States only notionally. Whether States' shares are constitutionally guaranteed or legislatively determined, individual States can legitimately present themselves as having no control over the definition of the tax base, the setting of the overall tax rates, or the precise details of the revenue sharing formula -and hence, having no direct responsibility for revenue raised. As pointed out by Queensland Treasury (1999, pjii) , "while the resultant revenue will be distributed to the States, the GST will remain a Commonwealth tax to be varied only with the support of the Commonwealth Parliament. Rather than redress VFl, the proposed reforms wouldfurther reduce the revenue autonomy ofindividual States and Territories." It is again apparent that VFI will be exacerbated, not reduced, by the proposed refonns.
Moreover, to the extent that the predictability of State funding is enhanced, the Commonwealth's fiscal flexibility may be diminished and the effectiveness of Commonwealth macroeconomic policy tools (e.g. aimed at increasing public sector savings) could be reduced, because the Commonwealth may have no control The Commonwealth Government's initiative has involved the replacement of various State taxes with the nationally levied GST. Evaluating the equity and efficiency implications of the changes therefore requires a comparison between the equity and efficiency characteristics ofthe GST and those of the pertinent State taxes. In terms of efficiency, State taxes perform poorly. Payroll tax represents the largest source of State taxation revenue, even though it is a politically unwelcome and contentious tax on employment. It is the only broadly-based State tax and, at least on that ground, is less distortionary than the other taxes (Ryan, 1995; Crowe, 1996; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998) . Most other State taxes are distortionary and encourage substitution ofuntaxed forms ofeconomic activity. Whilst some ofthese distortionary taxes such as tobacco and liquor franchise fees can be justified on externality grounds, many caqnot (Rowand Duhs, I 998a). Although payroll tax is considered to be a broadly-based tax (albeit one that is criticised during these times of high unemployment), what is significant is that the States have had no access to broad-based income taxes, broad-based consumption taxes, or more appropriate taxes on wealth or the transfer of wealth (Collins, 1993, p.I64; Kerr, 1993, p.72) . The imperfect substitutes of land taxes and stamp duties have been criticised on both efficiency and equity grounds.
State taxes -often termed "nuisance" taxes -are commonly condemned as inappropriate sources for major revenues for any level of government in either federal or unitary systems (Rounds, 1992, pp.4-5; Walsh, 1992, p.6; and Walsh and Thompson, 1994, p.5) .ln this regard, much has been said of State governments not having access to growth taxes. Gabbitas' and Eldridges 1998 analysis, which is largely based on the 1988 Collins Review of the New South Wales tax system, provides a recent attempt to determine the income elasticity of State taxes (i.e. the increase in a tax base over time as the economy grows). Table 2 indicates that these elasticity estimates vary considerably, but average close to one for total State taxes, indicating that with no change ofthe State tax base or the rate, State tax revenue will increase in about the same proportion as Gross State Product (GSP). State taxation essentially involves a multiplicity of rates applied to narrow bases. The narrowing of bases has been largely through politically induced concessions (e.g. abolition ofdeath duties in 1976 (Gramlich, 1984) , and Queensland Government provision of various payroll tax exemptions and deductions, including exemptions to employers with an annual payroll of$0.85 million or less (Queensland Government, 2000) . This has facilitated both distortions in resource use and undesirable equity results. However, while compliance and collection costs render some State taxes as genuinely "nuisance" taxes, the fact that small amounts of revenue are collected from multiple bases is not in itself a compelling criticism. As Walsh (1990, p.66) explains, the ideal distribution of revenue collection across alternative bases would involve equalising the marginal efficiency costs ofcollection.
It is by no means obvious that this would imply reliance on fewer revenue sources.
Extensive use of narrow-based taxes nonetheless remains difficult to defend on efficiency or equity grounds. Being narrowly based, State taxes have been levied heavily on business inputs in some industries (e.g. mining via royalties, payroll tax and excessive rail freight charges). Taxes such as financial institutions duty and the bank accounts debits tax, by virtue of their inability to cope with sophisticated financial instruments and transactions, induce serious distortions (Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pp.204-205) . Despite having only limited taxing powers, the States and Territories have not fully exploited the broader based taxes available to them, leading to excessive reliance on inefficient, narrowly based taxes. Even those taxes with potentially the broadest applications, namely, payroll and land taxes, have been substantially circumscribed through exemptions and concessions.
Estimates from Western Australia for 1989-90 indicate that the compliance costs of State taxes are, on the whole, quite acceptable, with the exception of land tax (Working Party on Tax Powers, 1991, p.21; Kerr, 1993, p.73) . However, Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998, p.43) maintain that "it is difficult to draw fum conclusions about the cost of administering State taxes across Australia, owing to differing institutional arrangements between States and the paucity of published data." Nevertheless, an absence of hannonised bases can result in businesses operating in different States incurring high compliance costs. In some cases, substantial interstate rate and base differences facilitate undue base mobility, tax evasion and high enforcement costs. The use of tax thresholds and multiple rates tends to be discriminatory and induces problems concerning indexation and cyclically unstable revenues (Oakes, 1985, pp.64-67; Walsh, 1990, p.67; Collins, 1993, pp.169-170; Kerr, 1993, pp.72-73; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pp.52-54) .
As with many Commonwealth taxes, most State taxes perform poorly when assessed against equity requirements. Both the Collins Review (NSW Tax Task Force, 1988) and the Nieuwenhuysen Committee (Committee oflnquiry into State Government Revenue Raising, 1983) have concluded that almost all State taxes are regressive and do not serve the goal of distributional equity well (see also Working Party on Tax Powers, 1991, p.22; Riha, 1992, p.53; Kerr, 1993, p.73; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pAO) . These findings remain contentious however arid critics await more rigorous evaluation and more conclusive results.
The State taxation environment in Australia also gives rise to horizontal equity concerns in that individuals and businesses are taxed differently depending on their location (Collins, 1993, pp.164, 175; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pAl) . Tables 3  and 4 indicate the relative tax burdens imposed in different States in terms of the legal incidence of the relevant taxes, fees and fines. In its budget for 2000-01, the Queensland Government noted that estimated 2000-01 per capita collections of State taxes, fees and fines in Queensland -at $1,359 -will remain considerably lower than the average of other States, where, on average, the tax burden is forecast to be 27,6 per cent higher, 5. THE END OF QUEENSLAND'S LOW TAX DAYS? Robinson (1998, p,15) maintains that "the crucial point to remember is that the introduction of the GST will effectively end Queensland's position as a low tax State," As he puts it (1998, p,15) , this simply reflects the fact that the "".new arrangements will mean the combined total of Commonwealth and state taxes levied on Queenslanders will rise to about the Australian average, The GSTwill be levied at a unifonn rate across the country whereas, by contrast, the state taxes which it would be replacing are levied at different rates in different states -and are significantly lower in Queensland."
Successive Queensland governments have highlighted the State's low taxation status. Table 4 shows that in 1998-99, Queensland had the lowest per capita taxes, fees and fines of $1,280. New South Wales was approximately 68 per cent higher at $2,153. It must be appreciated, however, that Queensland's low tax status is Table 5 shows the service provision ratio for each State between 1985-86 and 1998-99, relative to the Australian average. Put differently, it illustrates the policy effort being made by a State in terms of actual expenditure on services compared with the expenditure which it would have to make to provide services at an Australian average standard (Rowand Duhs, 1998b, p.69) . The data reveal thai there were considerable variations in lhe level of service provision both within and among the Slates over the period 1985-8610 1998-99 . Queensland service provision ralios slayed substantially below average. Gi ven sufficient differences in efficiency levels, however, the Queensland government' s service delivery or policy outcomes would not necessarily be inferior, notwithstanding Queensland's below-average levels of expenditure on services relative to the other states, as revealed in Table 5 . Table 6 presents revenue-raising effort ratios between 1985-86 and 1998-99 . Put simply, it shows the policy effort being made by a State in terms of revenue being raised from taxes and charges, compared with the revenue a State would raise if it applied rates of taxes and charges at an average Australian standard. Table 6 shows there was considerable variation in the revenue-raising effort bolh within and between the States between 1985-86 and 1998-99 , and that in the case of Queensland, revenue-raising effort consistently remained substantially below the Australian average'.
Overall fiscal symmetry in each State's budgetary stance is shown when Tables 5 and 6 are compared. Victoria and South Australia, for example, can be seen to have above-average revenue-raising and service provision policies. While Queensland governments often boast that Queensland is a low tax Stale, they are slowerto add that Queensland is also a low service provision State. On the whole, it is apparent thai those States which elected to pursue above-standard levels of service provision also applied above-standard severity in their revenue-raising efforts.
The analyses undertaken by Queensland Treasury (1998 and and Robinson (1998) capture an important economic effect ofreplacing the nominated Stale taxes with the nalional GST. Nonetheless it does not necessarily follow that the replacement of the selected State taxes with the national GST will threaten the down from 85.8% in 1995-96 to 81.8% in 1997-98 and 81.4% in 1998-99, vehicles, land and gambling). After the elimination of bed taxes and FlO, this can still be expected to account for approximately 65 per cent of the pre-GST State tax regime. Moreover, the likelihood of such action occurring is particularly evident given both the Beattie Government's 1999 decision to reduce payroll tax and the tendency of the States to circumscribe the broader based taxes available to them through exemptions and concessions (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.61) .
Second, given that the Commonwealth Grants Commission principle of fiscal capacity equalisation will be employed in distributing GST proceeds to the States, the national GST need not substantially alter the long-run relativities between the States' taxation stances. The Commission strives to place each State in a position where it has the fiscal capacity to provide the same level of public services and to levy taxes at the same rate. Of course, individual States may choose not to do so, as evidenced by the variations shown above in the States' revenue raising and expenditure activities. Thus, the Grants Commission methodology, combined with the States' continued capacity 10 manipulate their own tax bases (and the way they choose to spend the additional GST revenues made available to them) can be expected to leave the States with considerable discretion overtheir taxation stances. There is therefore no reason to suggest that Queensland's days as a low tax State are necessarily numbered as a result of the GST refonns.
CONCLUSIONS
While the GST tax package is now a fact of life, issues of Commonwealth-State financial relations and VFI remain important (Rowand Duhs, 1998a and 1998b) , if less publicised. In fact, there are various consequences of the refonn agenda for Commonwealth-Stale financial relations. The initial interim revenue sharing agreement between the Commonwealth and the States was criticised on the grounds that, contrary to the principle offiscal capacity equalisation, Queensland taxpayers have been required to subsidise the removal of bed taxes and financial institutions duty (FlO) by other States. Subsequent amendments 10 the revenue-sharing proposal which received the support of the Queensland Governmenl following increased Commonwealth financial assistance to the states, still left Queensland with a revenue shortfall of $130 million per annum. While the States will benefit to some extentfrom greater revenue certainty under the new tax sharing arrangements, greater fiscal autonomy for the States nonetheless exists only nominally. Conclusion one therefore is that the VFI problem may be said to be worsened, not improved, by the tax refonn package. Conclusion two is that inequities remain in the tax compensation arrangements, despite appeal to one principle or another of fiscal hannorusation. Although these compensation arrangements are now matters of record, the fact remains that L~e good offices of subsequent Commonwealth governments will be appealed to when future disputes and refonns arise, and concerns about present inequities may yet be brought to bear in future debates.
The refonned revenue sharing agreement between the Commonwealth and the States has efficiency implications for the overall tax mix and offers the opportunity to address a number ofconcerns regarding the degree of VA, including its capacity to partially satisfy the States' desire for greater predictability and certainty in their annual funding. Conversely, the accountability gains, if any, are likely to be marginal as revenue sharing only notionally passes responsibility to the States. Conclusion three is that the potential efficiency gains from increased State revenue predictability must be assessed against the Commonwealth Government's continued capacity to control State expenditures through the maintenance of specific purpose payments (SPPs), together with any inefficiencies attributable to heightened VR. Moreover, while the GST has attracted much public scrutiny, the fact that the post-GST State tax regime fares poorly when assessed against the standard tax design criteria is probably less well appreciated. In terms of efficiency, State taxes perform poorly in that they are distortionary and encourage substitution of untaxed forms of economic activity~are commonly condemned as inappropriate sources of major revenues for any level of government; and have been substantially narrowed through politically induced concessions. Most State taxes also perform poorly when assessed against equity requirements, alleast according to both the NS W Tax Taskforce and Nieuwenhuysen, albeit critics continue to ask for more rigorous evidence. In terms of vertical equity, almost all State taxes are regressive. The State taxation environment also gives rise to horizontal equity concerns in that individuals and businesses are taxed differently depending on their location. While the disparities in tax effort between the States have narrowed over time, differences remain. Conclusion four is that the national GST may actually enhance economic efficiency and equity, to the extent that it facilitates reduced reliance on the present raft of narrowly based State taxes.
Variability in State tax and expenditure regimes remains both possible and likely. Contrary to the Queensland Premier's assertion, this paper accordingly finds that the GSTleviedbytheCommonwealthGovemmentneednotadverselyaffectQueensland's low taxation status which in any event should not be construed as being unequivocally good, since it is maintained by below-average levels of service provision. Scope for debate remains over the extent to which Queensland's low taxi low service provision mix reflects a conscious choice by the electorate, the extent to which the electorate is less aware of the low service provision than of the low tax status, and of the possibility that service provision as measured by the Commonwealth Grants Commission is misleading because ofinadequate allowance for efficiency differences. Nevertheless, the States will maintain a significant proportion oftheir State tax bases, and considerable discretion remains available to Queensland governments over both tax and expenditure regimes. Conclusion five is that Queensland's days as a low tax State are not necessarily numbered, although the scope for maintaining the pre-GST extent of the differential in State taxes may be circumscribed. 
